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GOVERNMENT DRAGNETS 
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution (and perhaps 
even the United States itself) exists because the American colonists abhorred 
the suspicionless house-to-house searches visited upon them by government 
officials armed with so-called “general warrants.”1 These warrants, authorized 
by British-dominated legislatures, permitted fishing expeditions for evidence of 
sedition or nonpayment of customs taxes. They were so despised by some 
segments of the colonies that they are said to have been a major cause of the 
Revolutionary War.2 The Fourth Amendment reflects the fact that, during the 
era when writs of assistance and other general warrants held sway, the colonists 
did not feel secure in their houses, persons, papers, or effects because the 
Crown could thoroughly search them virtually at will. Although many aspects of 
the history and meaning of the Fourth Amendment are in dispute, all 
commentators agree that the amendment’s second clause, the “Warrant 
Clause”—providing that search and arrest warrants be based on probable cause 
and describe with particularity the place to be searched and person or items to 
be seized—was meant to do away with general warrants.3 
The general warrant is still very much with us today, however, if it is defined 
as the power of the executive branch, on its own or on the basis of vague 
legislative authorization, to engage in large-scale intrusions into the citizenry’s 
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 1. See generally JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 31 
(1966) (detailing the colonial backlash to the general searches sanctioned by writs of assistance); 
NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 51 (1937) (same). 
 2. As John Adams said of James Otis’ oration against the writs of assistance in 1761, “Then and 
there was the first scene of opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain.” LASSON, supra note 1, 
at 59. Lasson concludes that this speech was the “first in the chain of events which led directly and 
irresistibly to revolution and independence.” Id. at 51. 
 3. The leading treatment of this issue is found in TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 43 (1968) (indicating that the drafting process of the Fourth 
Amendment “reinforces the conclusion that it was the warrant which was the initial and primary object 
of the amendment”). See also Thomas Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. 
REV. 547, 583 (1999) (“No one questions that the Framers despised and sought to ban general 
warrants.”). 
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houses, persons, papers, and effects in the absence of probable cause to believe 
any particular person affected has done or possesses something that justifies the 
intrusion. Homes and businesses across the country are routinely subjected to 
warrantless health and safety inspections by local and state agencies. Without 
any individualized suspicion or judicial preclearance, criminal offenders must 
submit to strip searches and swabs for DNA analysis, school children must 
undergo drug testing, motorists are stopped at roadblocks and checkpoints, and 
pedestrians in our major cities are monitored by camera systems. Data mining 
programs covertly sweep through hundreds of thousands of records containing 
all sorts of personal information upon little or no showing of cause. And 
everyone’s personal effects are uniformly scanned and searched at borders, 
airports, and various other major travel hubs. If we throw into the mix 
investigative programs designed to take advantage of pretextual searches and 
seizures—that is, searches and seizures avowedly based on probable cause for a 
minor infraction but actually designed to find evidence of a more-serious crime 
for which there is no cause or only an inchoate hunch—then “general warrant” 
actions are also quite common in connection with traffic stops, enforcement of 
loitering laws, and a host of other government actions. 
This juxtaposition of modern, large-scale, law-enforcement techniques with 
the general-warrant searches that incensed the colonists is not meant to suggest 
that all group searches were, are, or should be considered violations of the 
Fourth Amendment. The colonists passed a number of laws that permitted 
suspicionless general inspections, and, for its part, a majority of the Supreme 
Court has made clear or has strongly suggested that it does not view any of the 
aforementioned government actions to be infringements of the Constitution.4 
Even the more liberal members of the Court are willing to agree that many of 
these decisions are justified by legitimate law-enforcement needs.5 
It is also apparent, however, that courts and commentators have paid 
insufficient attention to searches and seizures of groups, a phenomenon 
referred to in this article as “government dragnets” because such searches 
attempt to cull out bad actors through ensnaring a much larger number of 
individuals who are innocent of any wrongdoing. At least in part because an 
individualized-suspicion requirement would end any possibility of authorizing 
group searches, Fourth Amendment law today evaluates government-dragnet 
actions not under the Warrant Clause—the clause that supposedly outlaws 
general searches—but under the first clause of the amendment, which bars 
“unreasonable” searches and seizures. The Warren Court provided some 
discernible guideposts for making this reasonableness determination.6 But these 
 
 4. See infra II. 
 5. For example, see Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 515 
U.S. 646, 666 (1995) (joining opinion permitting drug testing of public-school athletes), and Justice 
Souter’s dissenting opinion in United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 208 (2002) (stating that 
suspicionless searches of people and luggage at airports is “universally accepted”). 
 6. See infra IIA. 
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guideposts proved to be weakly grounded, and the post-Warren Court has 
pretty much ignored them in the course of approving almost every dragnet it 
has encountered.7 Recent commentary has either advocated an even more 
laissez-faire attitude toward dragnets or, at the other end of the spectrum, 
proposed schemes that would make most of them impossible.8 
The analytical extremism of courts and commentators is understandable, 
since dragnets are important components of modern-day law enforcement at 
the same time that they pose serious threats to liberty and social stability. 
Nonetheless, some middle ground that does a better job sorting out the 
competing interests is necessary, because general-warrant-type operations are 
likely to increase astronomically in the near future, for at least three reasons. 
First, technological advances—cameras equipped with zoom and nightscope 
capacity, computers that can process millions of records in minutes, detection 
equipment that can see through clothes—have made dragnets more efficient, 
effective, and economical, or at least government officials think so. Second, 
concerns about national security, heightened since September 11, 2001, make 
such dragnets even more alluring than usual. Third, the dragnet mentality 
dovetails with government’s infatuation with profiling, the process of 
statistically or pseudo-statistically categorizing people as perpetrators and 
potential perpetrators of crime or other antisocial acts. If a profile exists that 
can tell us, based on certain types of behavior or particular types of 
transactions, that a person poses a given risk of harm, the temptation to obtain 
information about everyone’s behavior and transactions so that the profile can 
be applied becomes strong. 
Parts II and III of this article describe the nature and effects of dragnet 
actions. They do so primarily through the prism of Supreme Court and lower-
court cases, but these sections also look at law-enforcement efforts that have yet 
to lead to litigation and imagine future dragnet efforts as well, with a special 
emphasis on the role technology can play in motivating dragnets and carrying 
them out. Parts IV and V then summarize the Supreme Court’s approach to 
group searches and the most significant alternative proposals for dealing with 
them. These sections focus in particular on the interaction of two such 
proposals: Richard Worf’s argument that group searches should be analyzed 
against the backdrop of political-process theory9 and the proposal I have made 
that investigations of groups, like investigation of individuals, should be 
governed by proportionality and exigency considerations.10 In combination, 
these regulatory regimes would create a presumption that dragnets authorized 
 
 7. See infra IIB. 
 8. See infra IVB. 
 9. Richard C. Worf, The Case for Rational Basis Review of General Suspicionless Searches and 
Seizures, 23 TOURO L. REV. 93 (2007). 
 10. See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK 21–47 (2007) (summarizing analysis from two 
articles, Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1991), 
and Christopher Slobogin, Let’s Not Bury Terry: A Call for Rejuvenation of the Proportionality 
Principle, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1053 (1998)). 
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by narrow, nondiscriminatory legislative enactments are valid, but would also 
require that, on those frequent occasions when the presumption does not apply, 
the government demonstrate either that its “hit rate” will likely be 
proportionate to the intrusion visited on dragnet subjects or that the dragnet is 
necessary to prevent significant, specific, and imminent harm. 
II 
DRAGNET INVESTIGATIONS 
The term “government dragnet” as used in this article refers to 
programmatic government efforts to investigate, detect, deter, or prevent crime 
or other significant harm by subjecting a group of people, most of whom are 
concededly innocent of wrongdoing or of plans to engage in it, to a deprivation 
of liberty or other significant intrusion. Dragnet cases are considered here 
under three categories:11 those decided by the Supreme Court during Chief 
Justice Warren’s tenure, those decided by the Supreme Court and by lower 
courts during the post-Warren era, and recent or proposed manifestations of 
dragnets that have yet to lead to significant litigation. 
A. Warren-Court Opinions 
The leading case on the Fourth Amendment’s application to dragnet actions 
by the government is Camara v. Municipal Court, which dealt with area-wide 
health and safety inspections of residences, most of which did not pose any 
health or safety problems.12 An earlier Court decision, Frank v. Maryland,13 had 
held that such inspections need not be authorized by warrants because they are 
aimed at enforcing regulatory laws rather than at obtaining “evidence of 
criminal action.”14 The majority in Camara held, instead, that warrants are 
required in this situation, at least when the resident refuses an inspector entry.15 
Although agreeing that such entries are “a less hostile intrusion than the typical 
policeman’s search for the fruits and instrumentalities of crime,”16 Justice White 
stated for the Court that “[i]t is surely anomalous to say that the individual and 
his private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when 
the individual is suspected of criminal behavior.”17 He added that the threat of 
 
 11. A well-known forerunner to these cases was United States v. Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214, 219 
(1944), which authorized the detention of over 100,000 Japanese Americans during World War II 
because, according to the military, “immediate segregation of the disloyal from the loyal” was 
“impossible.” 
 12. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
 13. 359 U.S. 360 (1959). 
 14. Id. at 365. 
 15. 387 U.S. at 540. 
 16. Id. at 530. 
 17. Id. 
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ex ante judicial review would curb any tendency on the part of inspectors 
toward arbitrary home inspections.18 
At the same time, the majority rejected Mr. Camara’s argument that his 
house could not be inspected unless the government developed “probable 
cause” to believe that his particular home posed a health or safety risk. 
According to the Court, a probable-cause finding in this situation need not 
“depend upon specific knowledge of the condition of the particular dwelling” 
but rather could be based on “the passage of time, the nature of the building 
(for example, a multifamily apartment house), or the condition of the entire 
area.”19 The Court gave three reasons for approving this watered-down version 
of probable cause. First, both before and after passage of the Constitution, 
colonists enacted legislation authorizing various types of inspections in the 
absence of individualized suspicion, despite their abhorrence of the general 
warrant in other contexts.20 Second, the “public demands” its government 
prevent fires, disease, and other “dangerous” conditions traceable to poorly 
maintained homes, and nonindividualized inspections appeared to be the only 
way to accomplish this goal. As Justice White pointed out, many of these 
dangerous conditions, such as faulty wiring, cannot be detected from outside the 
home, and “[t]here is unanimous agreement among those most familiar with 
this field that the only effective way to seek universal compliance with the 
minimum standards required by municipal codes is through routine periodic 
inspections of all structures.”21 Finally, because the inspections involved 
examination of wires, pipes, and other structural components, “they involve a 
relatively limited invasion of the urban citizen’s privacy.”22 
In short, Camara appeared to establish that dragnet searches of homes—the 
major evil that the Fourth Amendment sought to avoid—are nonetheless 
permissible if necessary to prevent a significant danger to a great number of 
people, so long as the associated intrusion is not “personal in nature”23 and is 
pursuant to an objective, neutral inspection plan (as assessed by a court in those 
cases in which the intrusion is nonconsensual). The case also established that 
the Reasonableness Clause, not the Warrant Clause, is the linchpin of Fourth 
Amendment analysis in such cases. The Court explained “there can be no ready 
test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search 
against the invasion which the search entails.”24 
 
 18. Id. at 532. 
 19. Id. at 538. 
 20. Id. at 537 (citing Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 368–70 (1959) (recounting colonial statutes 
that permitted suspicionless or near-suspicionless searches of homes for health and safety reasons). See 
generally Fabio Arcila, The Death of Suspicion, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1275, 1298–1310 (2010) 
(discussing various Revolutionary-period statutes that permitted suspicionless searches). 
 21. Camara, 387 U.S. at 535–36. 
 22. Id. at 537. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 536–37. 
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Davis v. Mississippi,25 decided two years later, involved a very different type 
of dragnet but relied on similar analysis in declaring it unconstitutional. John 
Davis was one of twenty-four African American youth brought to the police 
station in Meridian, Mississippi, to be fingerprinted and questioned during a 
ten-day investigation of a rape. The government argued that detention for 
fingerprinting did not implicate the Fourth Amendment because (1) the process 
was not “accusatory” as to Mr. Davis (apparently precisely because so many 
people were fingerprinted) and (2) fingerprinting detentions are relatively 
unintrusive.26 
The Court rejected the first position because it “would subject unlimited 
numbers of innocent persons to the harassment and ignominy incident to 
involuntary detention.”27 Analogous to Camara’s holding that the Fourth 
Amendment applies in civil as well as criminal actions, Davis stressed that the 
Fourth Amendment is triggered by a search or seizure regardless of whether the 
targets are accused or suspected of crime.28 
Yet in its treatment of the government’s second argument, the Court 
seemed to back away from a complete dismissal of dragnet detentions. Justice 
Brennan’s opinion stated that, because of their “unique nature,” detentions for 
fingerprinting “might, under narrowly defined circumstances, be found to 
comply with the Fourth Amendment even though there is no probable cause in 
the traditional sense,” and cited Camara.29 The Court noted that, because such a 
detention does not involve the type of “probing into an individual’s private life 
and thoughts that marks an interrogation or search,” it could not be used as a 
harassment device (since only one print is needed), and further pointed out that 
fingerprinting is “an inherently more reliable and effective crime-solving tool 
than eyewitness identifications or confessions;” accordingly, larger-scale 
detentions for fingerprinting purposes might be permissible, at least if 
“authorized by a judicial officer.”30 However, because no such authorization 
occurred in Davis, and because interrogation accompanied the fingerprinting, 
the Court did not pursue this line of reasoning further. 
Camara authorized and Davis contemplated dragnets, but only if they (1) 
are subject to judicial authorization when nonconsensual, (2) are effective 
means of averting a significant danger or solving a crime that cannot be averted 
or solved through development of individualized suspicion, and (3) do not 
involve the types of intrusions associated with physical searches for evidence of 
crime or interrogations. The first two of these limitations disappeared in 
subsequent Court decisions, and the third may be on its way out as well. 
 
 25. 394 U.S. 721 (1969). 
 26. Id. at 726. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 726–27. 
 29. Id. at 727. 
 30. Id. at 727–28. 
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B. Post–Warren-Court Opinions 
The abandonment of any discernible limitations on reasonableness analysis 
by the post–Warren Court can be traced in three different lines of cases, having 
to do with business inspections, roadblocks, and drug testing. In each, the Court 
has essentially declared that Fourth Amendment doctrine should resemble 
third-tier analysis in Fourteenth Amendment cases.31 So long as a rational basis 
underlies the legislative or executive decision to engage in the dragnet, it is 
constitutional. 
1. Business Inspections 
In See v. City of Seattle, a companion case to Camara, the Court imposed the 
same limitations on health and safety inspections of businesses that Camara 
required in the residential context.32 But in 1970, the year after Chief Justice 
Warren was replaced by Chief Justice Burger, the Court decided Colonnade v. 
United States. In that case the Court held, in contrast to Camara and See, that a 
liquor-store owner could be fined for refusing to permit warrantless entry by 
Internal Revenue Service inspectors, although forcible entry still required a 
warrant.33 Two years later in United States v. Biswell, a case involving inspection 
of gun dealers,34 the Court in effect did away with the latter caveat. Justice 
White, the author of Camara, reasoned that the process contemplated in 
Camara and See, whereby the inspector first asks for permission to search and 
then resorts to a Camara-type warrant only if refused, would not work in the 
gun-store-inspection setting, in which evidence of a violation might disappear 
before the inspector returns with the warrant. Thus, White opined, 
“unannounced, even frequent” warrantless inspections are necessary in this 
setting.35 
As an added justification for this holding, Justice White asserted that these 
types of inspections were not particularly intrusive, because “[w]hen a dealer 
chooses to engage in this pervasively regulated business and to accept a federal 
license, he does so with the knowledge that his business records, firearms, and 
ammunition will be subject to effective inspection.”36 The idea that notice of 
inspections reduces their intrusiveness gained currency in later cases. In 
Marshall v. Barlow’s Inc., the Court held that a Camara-type warrant process 
was required under the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) in part 
because many of the enterprises subject to inspection did not have a long, 
 
 31. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 10, at 40–41. 
 32. 387 U.S. 541 (1967). 
 33. 397 U.S. 72 (1970). 
 34. 406 U.S. 311 (1972). 
 35. Id. at 316 (“[I]f inspection is to be effective and serve as a credible deterrent, unannounced, 
even frequent, inspections are essential.”). 
 36. Id. 
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pervasive history of regulation,37 while in Donovan v. Dewey the Court stressed 
the coal-mining industry’s “notorious history of serious accidents and 
unhealthful working conditions” in concluding that Biswell applied to 
inspections under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act.38 Dewey also added 
to Biswell’s notice and necessity requirements the stipulation that the inspection 
program be authorized by a statute that provided “a constitutionally adequate 
substitute for a warrant” consisting of rules regarding how often inspections 
could take place, the scope of the inspection, and how special privacy concerns 
could be accommodated.39 
In New York v. Burger, however, the consent-qua-notice rationale was 
ignored, and the adequate-warrant substitute and necessity stipulations from 
previous cases were also given short shrift.40 Burger upheld a New York statute 
permitting government officials, including the police, to enter junkyards to 
inspect documents and to look for stolen vehicles or car parts.41 Previous 
regulation of junkyard owners had been nowhere near as intrusive, thus 
slighting the notice rationale.42 Dewey’s warrant-substitute notion was also 
minimized, because the junkyard search could take place on a police officer’s 
whim, so long as it occurred during business hours.43 As to the necessity 
requirement, Justice Blackmun’s opinion did at least allude to it, by asserting 
that, as in Colonnade and Biswell, an inspection scheme based on notice or 
warrants would not work in this situation because stolen parts often move 
“quickly” through junkyards.44 But as Professor Clancy noted in his criticism of 
Burger, “Ease of discovery is a far cry from a demonstration that the technique 
is essential or indispensable.”45 
After Burger, it is no longer necessary (if it ever really was) to show that a 
dragnet targeted at businesses is, in Camara’s words, “the only effective way” of 
achieving the government’s goal.46 Nor need the inspection place any significant 
limitations on executing officials. Although business inspections must still be 
less intrusive than an ordinary search, apparently this need be so only in the 
Biswell–Burger sense that the business owner know that the business will be 
subject to some sort of regulation, a showing that presumably can be made in 
 
 37. 436 U.S. 307, 313–14 (1978). One might also note that many types of OSHA violations (having 
to do with unsafe working conditions) are less amenable to concealment than gun- and liquor-law 
violations and that, if they are corrected before the inspector returns with a warrant, the regulatory 
regime has accomplished its purpose. 
 38. 452 U.S. 594, 603 (1981). 
 39. Id. 
 40. 482 U.S. 691 (1987). 
 41. Id. at 708. 
 42. Id. at 721 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[I]f New York City’s administrative scheme renders the 
vehicle-dismantling business closely regulated, few businesses will escape such a finding.”). 
 43. Id. at 711. 
 44. Id. at 710. 
 45. Thomas Clancy, The Role of Individualized Suspicion in Assessing the Reasonableness of 
Searches and Seizures, 25 U. MEMPHIS L. REV. 483, 604 (1995). 
 46. Camara, 387 U.S. at 535.  
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virtually all business-inspection situations. Thus, the primary impact of this last 
requirement, as currently construed by the Court, is to prevent government 
from conducting dragnet searches of residences for evidence of crime. 
Even that limitation could disappear under certain conditions. In Chicago in 
1994, police conducted sweeps of every apartment unit in a public-housing 
project that had recently experienced repeated shootings and other crime 
related to gang warfare.47 A federal district court granted a preliminary 
injunction enjoining future sweeps unless the government demonstrated 
exigency (which the court held had not justified the previous sweeps) or showed 
“oral or written” consent on the part of apartment occupants.48 Within a week 
of the ruling, the Clinton Administration’s Department of Housing and Urban 
Development proposed that consent for the sweeps be obtained by making 
acquiescence to them a condition of each tenant’s lease, although apparently 
only if the residents in a given building “voted” for such a lease provision.49 
Although the proposal was never implemented, if it had been and a majority of 
tenants had agreed to such a condition, Biswell–Burger might allow dragnet 
sweeps of the entire housing project upon a showing that the sweeps could help 
reduce shootings. 
2. Roadblocks 
Checkpoints at the border or their effective equivalent (including 
international waterways and international airports) have long been sanctioned.50 
At the border, the Court has said the government’s interest in national self-
protection is “at its zenith” and that privacy interests are minimal, apparently 
because, analogous to businesses seeking licenses, those seeking to enter the 
country expect and understand the need for such searches.51 Thus routine 
searches of persons and thorough inspections of effects, including cars,52 may 
take place at the border in the absence of suspicion. 
Checkpoints in the interior have been more controversial. The Supreme 
Court’s first roadblock case was United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,53 decided well 
after the Warren Court years. In that case, the Court upheld permanent 
checkpoints established up to 100 miles from the Mexican border as a means of 
capturing illegal immigrants. As a justification for the thousands of concededly 
 
 47. Gwen Ifill, Clinton Asks Help on Police Sweeps in Public Housing, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1994, 
at 1. 
 48. Pratt v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 848 F. Supp. 792, 797 (N.D. Ill. 1994). 
 49. Ifill, supra note 47, at 1. 
 50. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925) (“Travelers may be so stopped in crossing 
an international boundary because of national self-protection reasonably requiring one entering the 
country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully 
brought in.”). 
 51. See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004); United States v. Montoya de 
Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 539–40 (1985). 
 52. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 155–56. 
 53. 428 U.S. 543 (1976). 
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suspicionless stops made at these stations, the Court purported to rely on 
Camara, asserting that the “need to make routine checkpoint stops [to detect 
illegal aliens] is great,” and the “intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests 
quite limited.”54 It reached the latter conclusion because the checkpoints 
targeted cars (as opposed to houses), the stops were brief (only a few seconds 
initially and three to five minutes if an officer concluded that further 
investigation into citizenship status was necessary), and the operation of the 
roadblock was “regularized.”55 Regularity derived primarily from the facts that 
“the location of a fixed checkpoint is not chosen by officers in the field, but by 
officials responsible for making overall decisions as to the most effective 
allocation of limited enforcement resources” and that only those cars passing 
the checkpoint could be stopped in the absence of suspicion.56 Motorists were 
also notified of the checkpoint through signs on the highway, thereby avoiding 
“surprise,” and they could see that other cars were being stopped, thus 
minimizing “concern” and “fright.”57 
Justice Brennan, in dissent, berated the majority for allowing “standardless 
seizures,” which he contrasted to Camara’s warrant requirement based on 
objective factors for nonconsensual intrusions.58 He also argued that less 
discretionary options were available. Pointing out that one of the primary 
justifications for diverting cars to the secondary checkpoint for further 
investigation was the nature of the vehicle stopped, including the number of 
people in the car and whether any were trying to hide, he questioned why the 
majority so easily discarded an individualized-suspicion requirement.59 He 
added: 
Every American citizen of Mexican ancestry and every Mexican alien lawfully in this 
country must know after today’s decision that he travels the fixed checkpoint 
highways at the risk of being subjected not only to a stop, but also to detention and 
interrogation, both prolonged and to an extent far more than for non-Mexican 
appearing motorists.60 
Three years later in Delaware v. Prouse the Court suggested that, if the 
government is going to conduct dragnet seizures of motorists, it must do so 
through a regularized tactic such as a roadblock.61 The specific holding in Prouse 
was that suspicionless, random stops by individual police officers for the 
purpose of checking licenses are unconstitutional because they are not 
“sufficiently productive to qualify as a reasonable law-enforcement practice 
under the Fourth Amendment” and give “unbridled discretion” to individual 
 
 54. Id. at 557. 
 55. Id. at 559. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 558. 
 58. Id. at 568–69 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 59. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 576 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 60. Id. at 572 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 61. 440 U.S. 648 (1979). 
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law-enforcement officers.62 The majority asserted that stops based on 
individualized suspicion would catch many of the unlicensed (and therefore 
presumably less safe) drivers.63 It also indicated in dictum, citing Martinez-
Fuerte, that a license-checkpoint procedure would be permissible because it 
involves “less intrusion” and does not allow “the unconstrained exercise of 
discretion.”64 
The lone dissenter, Chief Justice Rehnquist, questioned the efficacy of the 
first alternative and the impact of the second. He argued against an 
individualized-suspicion requirement on the ground that the state’s goal in 
nabbing unlicensed drivers is to prevent unsafe driving, which is hardly achieved 
by waiting until the unsafe driving occurs.65 And he wondered whether imposing 
inconvenience on many drivers via roadblocks rather than on a few drivers 
through random stops made sense; in any event, any reduction in anxiety 
associated with a roadblock was “an insufficient basis” for preferring the latter 
over the former.66 
This latter sentiment did not mean that Rehnquist had a problem with 
roadblocks, of course. In Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, he wrote 
the majority opinion upholding a sobriety checkpoint.67 To the dissent’s 
argument that watching for erratic driving was a more effective way to detect 
and deter drunk driving, Rehnquist responded that 
[e]xperts in police science might disagree over which of several methods of 
apprehending drunken drivers is prefer[]able as an ideal [but] for purposes of Fourth 
Amendment analysis, the choice among such reasonable alternatives remains with the 
governmental officials who have a unique understanding of, and a responsibility for, 
limited public resources, including a finite number of police officers.68 
Thus, as with business inspections, so with roadblocks: the decision as to 
whether to use this dragnet procedure is almost entirely up to the executive 
branch of the government. 
The one major caveat to this rule in the roadblock context came in 
Indianapolis v. Edmond, in which the Court held that suspicionless stops at 
roadblocks that are established primarily “to uncover evidence of ordinary 
criminal wrongdoing” such as drug trafficking are not permissible.69 According 
to the Court, the checkpoints in Martinez-Fuerte, Prouse, and Sitz were all set 
up for more-focused purposes: Martinez-Fuerte to supplement control of the 
border and Prouse and Sitz to promote highway safety.70 The roadblock in 
 
 62. Id. at 660–61. 
 63. Id. at 659–60. 
 64. Id. at 663. 
 65. Id. at 666 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 66. Id. at 667 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 67. 496 U.S. 444 (1990). 
 68. Id. at 453–54. 
 69. 531 U.S. 32, 42 (2000). 
 70. Id. at 41–42. 
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Edmond, however, was clearly denominated a “Narcotics Checkpoint.”71 If such 
a tactic were allowed, Justice O’Connor stated for the Court, “the Fourth 
Amendment would do little to prevent such intrusions from becoming a routine 
part of American life.”72 
Unfortunately for this point of view, the lower courts have tended to abide 
by law-enforcement characterizations of the motivation for roadblocks and thus 
have been quite willing to permit them even when they are outfitted with drug-
sniffing dogs or set up after recent crime waves, so long as their avowed purpose 
is traffic safety.73 Lower courts have also been willing to permit dragnet actions 
for the purpose of detecting and deterring terrorists, even though these actions 
could also be said to be directed at “ordinary” criminal situations. In Cassidy v. 
Chertoff, for instance, Judge Sotomayor asserted that “[p]reventing or deterring 
large-scale terrorist attacks presents problems that are distinct from standard 
law enforcement needs and indeed go well beyond them.”74 Relying on 
MacWade v. Kelly,75 another Second Circuit opinion that had upheld random 
searches of items belonging to New York subway riders, she reasoned that, 
because the Coast Guard had identified the Lake Champlain ferry as a 
potential target and because the resulting searches of bags and car trunks were 
announced beforehand, lasted only a few moments, applied to everyone, and 
focused on finding explosives, the Fourth Amendment was not violated.76 Citing 
the language from Sitz quoted above, Judge Sotomayor also dismissed the 
argument that the government should have used magnetometers to accomplish 
its goal in a less intrusive manner.77 
3. Drug Testing 
The Supreme Court’s cases analyzing the constitutionality of drug-testing 
programs have looked at three now-familiar factors: the necessity for the 
dragnet approach, its intrusiveness, and whether it is aimed at obtaining 
evidence of crime or is instead motivated by some other purpose. But in this 
context, the Court has given the analysis a name—“special needs.” This term 
first appeared in Justice Blackmun’s concurring opinion in New Jersey v. 
T.L.O.,78 in which he stated that “[o]nly in those exceptional circumstances in 
which special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the 
warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable, is a court entitled to 
 
 71. Id. at 41. 
 72. Id. at 42. 
 73. See Brooks Holland, The Road ‘Round Edmond: Steering Through Primary Purpose and Crime 
Control Agendas, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 293, 298 (2006) (“[T]he weight of authority so far indicates that 
a secondary purpose of crime control will not upset a checkpoint with a lawful primary purpose.”) 
 74. 471 F.3d 67, 82 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 75. 460 F.3d 260 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 76. Cassidy, 471 F.3d at 78–79. 
 77. Id. at 80. 
 78. 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
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substitute its balancing of interests for that of the Framers.”79 Thus, in T.L.O., 
involving a search of a school pupil’s purse by a school official, the Court held 
that a warrant requirement would “unduly interfere with the maintenance of 
the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the schools” and that a 
high-suspicion requirement would be unduly burdensome in light of “the 
substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order 
in the schools” and the difficulty school officials might have in understanding 
the “niceties of probable cause.”80 
Although T.L.O. itself authorized only the relaxation, not the elimination, 
of individualized-suspicion requirements, the special-needs rubric has served as 
a rationalization for a number of dragnet tactics, including group-wide drug 
testing. In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association, the testing upheld 
by the Court was at least limited to railway workers who were involved in 
accidents or were thought to have violated safety rules.81 In Skinner’s 
companion case of National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,82 however, 
the Court upheld warrantless drug tests of anyone who applied for or sought 
promotion to certain customs jobs. Warrants were not required in either 
Skinner or Von Raab because everyone in the designated categories was tested, 
and thus executive officials did not exercise any discretion in deciding whom to 
test.83 And individualized suspicion was not required because the government’s 
interest in deterring and detecting drug usage outweighed employee privacy 
interests. The majority opinion, in each case authored by Justice Kennedy, 
conceded that, whether relying on blood, breath, or urine analyses, drug testing 
violates “bodily integrity.”84 But it considered the employees’ privacy interest to 
be diminished because “operational realities of the workplace may render 
entirely reasonable certain work-related intrusions by supervisors and co-
workers that might be viewed as unreasonable in other contexts.”85 
The Court relied heavily on the latter reasoning in its two cases analyzing 
drug testing of school children, in both cases permitting such testing because of 
schools’ “custodial responsibility and authority.”86 In Vernonia School District 
47J v. Acton, it upheld drug-testing programs directed at athletes,87 and in Board 
of Education v. Earls, it sanctioned testing of any student involved in 
competitive extracurricular activities, including cheerleading, band, and animal 
husbandry.88 Justice Breyer, the determining vote in the latter case, emphasized 
 
 79. Id. at 351. 
 80. Id. at 340–41, 343. 
 81. 489 U.S. 602 (1989). 
 82. 489 U.S. 656 (1989). 
 83. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 622; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 666–67. 
 84. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616–17. 
 85. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 671 (internal citation and quotation omitted). 
 86. Bd. of Ed. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 831 (2002). 
 87. 515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
 88. Earls, 536 U.S. at 841 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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that, as had occurred in Vernonia, the school board sought parental assent to 
the program, which was virtually unanimous among those who participated.89 
Of note in all of these cases is the Court’s typically nonchalant analysis of 
the government’s need to conduct the drug testing. Skinner at least cited some 
data suggesting significant substance abuse problems among railway workers.90 
And in another drug testing case, Chandler v. Miller,91 all but one of the justices 
voted to strike down a Georgia statute that required every person seeking 
nomination or election to a state office to undergo urinalysis, on the ground 
that the state was unable to point to any “concrete danger” such a program 
would prevent or deter.92 But Von Raab’s approval of customs-officer drug 
testing occurred despite Justice Scalia’s strong protestation that, in contrast to 
the railway-worker program at issue in Skinner, “neither frequency of use nor 
connection to harm is demonstrated or even likely.”93 And the five-member 
majority in Earls (which, it should be noted, included Justice Scalia), rejected 
the Tenth Circuit’s requirement that the school demonstrate “some identifiable 
drug abuse problem among a sufficient number of those subject to the testing, 
such that testing that group of students will actually redress its drug problem.”94 
Not only would that standard be too hard to administer, Justice Thomas stated 
for the majority, but “it would make little sense to require a school district to 
wait for a substantial portion of its students to begin using drugs before it was 
allowed to institute a drug testing program destined to deter drug use.”95 
Generally, therefore, it appears that almost any colorable demonstration of 
government need will suffice in these cases. 
Analogous to its stance in roadblock cases, however, the Court has drawn 
the line at testing aimed primarily at “ordinary” crime control, even when the 
danger is “concrete.” In Ferguson v. City of Charleston, local city and hospital 
officials devised a program that not only tested pregnant mothers to see if they 
were on crack cocaine, but also sent positive tests to law-enforcement officials.96 
The deciding vote to uphold the testing, from Justice Kennedy, keyed in on the 
fact that police had been involved in devising the policy and would use it to 
facilitate criminal prosecutions.97 
4. Other Current and Future Dragnets 
The group search and seizures that most frequently confront the courts—
business inspections, roadblocks, and drug testing—do not come close to 
exhausting the types of dragnets that the government currently pursues. 
 
 89. Id. 
 90. 489 U.S. at 602, 607 n.1. 
 91. 520 U.S. 305 (1997). 
 92. Id. at 318–19. 
 93. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 681 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 94. Earls, 536 U.S. at 828 (internal citation and quotation omitted). 
 95. Id. at 836. 
 96. 532 U.S. 67 (2001). 
 97. Id. at 88 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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Moreover, many of the dragnets that have been discussed could be 
immeasurably expanded through the use of technology. And the advent of 
profiling science makes dragnets even more tempting to government officials. 
Two particularly wide-ranging dragnets involve public camera surveillance 
and data mining. Today, thanks in part to post-9/11 federal funding, many major 
cities and a slew of medium-size and smaller urban areas have created camera-
surveillance systems that permit police to monitor large swaths of public and 
quasi-public areas.98 For instance, Chicago trains more than 2200 cameras on its 
urban populace day and night, every day of the week, some operating openly, 
others covertly; all are patched into the city’s $43 million operations center so 
that a dispatcher can send video images from the cameras located closest to the 
scene of a reported incident.99 The classic example of large-scale data mining is 
the Total Information Awareness (TIA) program, designed to access 
information from databases containing credit-card purchases, tax returns, 
driver’s license data, work permits, travel itineraries, and other digital sources 
to discover patterns predictive of terrorist activity.100 Although Congress 
defunded the program in 2003, since then new data-mining efforts that 
essentially carry out the same functions have come into existence.101 
Litigation over these technologically enhanced dragnets has not been 
significant, for a number of reasons. First, neither type of program has been 
particularly successful at detecting criminal or terrorist activity;102 as a result, 
criminal cases in which the constitutionality of the program might be challenged 
have been close to nonexistent. Second, some camera-surveillance operations 
and most data-mining efforts are conducted secretly; thus, for instance, most 
people are still not aware of the sequels to TIA. 
Perhaps the most important reason litigation over these types of dragnets 
has been negligible, however, is Supreme Court case law holding that the 
Fourth Amendment is not implicated by government surveillance of activities 
 
 98. SLOBOGIN, supra note 10, at 82–84. 
 99. Fran Spielman, Feds Give City $48 Million in Anti-terrorism Funds, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Dec. 4, 
2004, at 10. 
 100. GINA MARIE STEVENS, REPORT FOR CONGRESS: PRIVACY: TOTAL INFORMATION 
AWARENESS PROGRAMS AND RELATED INFORMATION ACCESS, COLLECTION, AND PROTECTION 
LAWS 2 (Cong. Research Serv., 2003), available at http://www.fas.org/ irp/crs/RL31730.pdf. 
 101. Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 317, 318 (2008). The federal government recently canceled its satellite-surveillance program, but 
only because law enforcement preferred TIA-like “fusion centers” that will create “a national 
suspicious activity reporting system.” Spencer S. Hsu, Napolitano Announced End to Domestic Spy 
Satellite Program, WASH. POST, June 23, 2009, at A8. 
 102. One meta-review of public camera-surveillance systems concluded that, on average across 
programs, it reduced crime four percent. BRANDON C. WELSH & DAVID P. FARRINGTON, CRIME 
PREVENTION EFFECTS OF CLOSE CIRCUIT TELEVISION: A SYSTEMATIC REVIEW 41 (United Kingdom 
Home Office Research, Dev., and Statistics Directorate 2002), available at 
http://rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/hors2002.html. Although data about covert antiterrorist data-mining 
are hard to obtain, the New York Times reported that virtually none of the leads such programs have 
generated panned out. Lowell Bergman et al., Spy Agency Data after Sept. 11 Led F.B.I. to Dead Ends, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2006, at A1. 
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carried out in public view103 or by government efforts to obtain personal 
information “voluntarily” surrendered to third parties such as banks, phone 
companies, and accounting firms.104 Because, the Court says, we assume the risk 
of disclosure to other parties in these situations, the people affected do not even 
have standing to raise a constitutional challenge.105 This caselaw means that, as 
far as the Constitution is concerned, use of cameras, tracking devices, and other 
technologies to monitor our public movements, as well as use of computers to 
aggregate personal information to compile “digital dossiers,”106 can proceed 
without having to check with a magistrate or provide any justification for doing 
so. 
For similar assumption-of-risk reasons, the Court has held that the Fourth 
Amendment does not regulate government reliance on technology that is in 
“general public use.”107 It has also concluded that “technology” that detects only 
the presence of contraband—for instance, a dog that sniffs drugs—invades no 
privacy interest protected by the Fourth Amendment.108 With these holdings in 
its armamentarium, the government’s ability to exploit dragnets unfettered by 
the Constitution increases exponentially. Even if completely lacking in 
individualized suspicion, the government can monitor house interiors with 
binoculars, flashlights, and telescopes (assuming these various common items 
are “in general public use”) or with devices that detect only the presence of 
illicit drugs or other contraband such as weapons (where carrying a concealed 
weapon is a crime). The latter devices can also be used to conduct suspicionless 
examinations of persons and cars on the public thoroughfares, either at 
roadblocks set up “primarily” for some other reason, or randomly, through 
attachments to cameras or police cruisers. 
Even with their economies, these various technologies might not normally 
tempt honest law-enforcement officers lacking a good-faith belief that their use 
is justified. But new developments are changing that calculus as well. First, of 
course, is the all-pervading fear of terrorist attacks, which thousands of local 
police have been deputized to prevent.109 Although the threat of such an attack 
 
 103. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283–84 (1983). 
 104. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (phone companies); United States v. Miller, 425 
U.S. 435 (1976) (banks). 
 105. The broadest statement to this effect comes from Miller— 
[T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third 
party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on 
the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the 
third party will not be betrayed. 
425 U.S. at 443. 
 106. The term comes from DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND 
PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 13 (2004). 
 107. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). 
 108. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005). 
 109. Eric Schmitt & David Johnston, States Chafing at U.S. Focus on Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, May 
26, 2008, at A1 (noting that “billions of dollars have been spent linking federal law enforcement and 
intelligence authorities to the country’s more than 750,000 police officers, sheriffs and highway patrol 
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is infinitesimal in any given area, the human and symbolic toll of even one such 
event has led, and will continue to lead, to a number of dragnet programs like 
the ferry and subway interdictions described earlier. 
Second, government officials have become enamored with profiling as a 
means of detecting terrorists and other types of wrongdoers. Of course, dragnet 
programs of yesteryear have often featured profiles, beginning with the neutral 
inspection plan required in Camara. But today, risk scores, no-fly lists, pattern- 
or algorithm-based data mining, link analysis of phone calls, and various other 
quasi-empirical attempts to connect certain traits or behaviors to bad people 
provide an incentive to conduct surveillance and to accumulate information on 
everyone, simply to see if anyone fits the profile. Thus, we find that the 
progenitors of TIA wanted to increase access to counter-terrorism information 
“by an order of magnitude” in order to develop and apply profiles that would 
“automatically cue analysts based on partial pattern matches.”110 
This type of nomothetic analysis is not confined to national-security venues. 
Law-enforcement agencies have also developed profiles of serial murderers, 
drug couriers, and drug users, all of which require acquiring information about 
a person’s habits, personality, and other traits in order to help police in their 
investigation.111 And of course DNA profiling has become a popular method of 
investigating and proving crime, resulting in DNA sweeps that have 
occasionally involved “asking” hundreds of people if they can be swabbed for 
the purpose of collecting a sample.112 To facilitate this type of profiling, every 
federal circuit addressing the issue has upheld the constitutionality of DNA-
sample collection from individuals convicted of violent felonies, many reasoning 
that in so doing the government “is not trying to determine that a particular 
individual has engaged in some specific wrongdoing” and thus is involved in a 
special-needs situation that does not trigger the usual Fourth Amendment 
constraints.113 A few courts have extended this analysis to nonviolent felons,114 
and programs aimed at arrestees are probably not far behind.115 
 
officers” through fusion centers that were originally “designed to collect and analyze data to deter 
terrorist attacks” and now are “branching out from terrorism to focus on violent crime and natural 
disasters”). 
 110. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY, REPORT 
TO CONGRESS REGARDING THE TERRORISM INFORMATION AWARENESS PROGRAM 3–9 (May 20, 
2003). 
 111. See, e.g., James Aaron George, Offender Profiling and Expert Testimony: Scientifically Valid or 
Glorified Results?, 61 VAND. L. REV. 221, 229 (2008) (describing profiles of offenders that include 
“gender, age, race or ethnicity, level of intelligence or schooling, military service status, job status, 
living circumstances, nature of interpersonal relationships, and even the make and color of the 
perpetrator’s car”). 
 112. Glynn Wilson, In Louisiana, Debate Over a DNA Dragnet, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 21, 
2003, at 3 (noting that police had obtained samples from over 800 men in southern Louisiana in an 
effort to catch a serial killer). 
 113. E.g., Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 668 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 114. E.g., State v. Martin, 955 A.2d 1144 (Vt. 2008). 
 115. See, e.g., United States v. Pool, No. 09-10303, 2010 WL 3554049 (9th Cir. Sept. 14, 2010) 
(upholding DNA sampling as a condition of pretrial release). 
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III 
WHY SHOULD WE CARE? 
The conflict over dragnets is understandable. General searches and seizures 
can be extremely useful, but they can also smack of the police state. Even 
dragnets that appear to be ineffective can serve vital government interests. For 
instance, most research indicates that public camera surveillance reduces crime 
in urban areas by only four to six percent.116 But those figures represent more 
than a trivial amount of crime (moreover, the better-run programs may reduce 
crime by as much as twenty to thirty percent, taking into account displacement 
effects117). Inspection programs, roadblocks, and drug-testing programs do not 
catch very many violators. But that may well be because, as some members of 
the Supreme Court are fond of pointing out, they are effective at deterring 
unwanted behavior.118 The proposed alternatives to dragnets—better 
investigations of car thieves (the alternative to the statute in Burger), more 
stops of heavily loaded cars near the border (as Justice Brennan suggested in 
Martinez-Fuerte), or closer attention to drug-induced behavior by customs 
agents or school children (as the dissenters in Vernonia and Earls argued)—are 
often pipe dreams and are usually less effective, more expensive, and 
conceivably more intrusively stigmatizing overall. It is also difficult, in the wake 
of 9/11, to muster much righteous indignation over a limited bag search of New 
York subway riders. 
Harder to grasp are the negative consequence of dragnets. We can start by 
asking why the Framers wanted to eliminate general-warrant searches of their 
homes. Principally, it was because those searches made them feel oppressed by 
a government that was willing to treat all of them like wrongdoers even though 
most of them were not.119 Many readers may feel perfectly secure from this kind 
of pressure in their lives. But imagine you are a Mexican American in Southern 
California who is subjected to document checks on major highways far from the 
border, or a student who has your blood drawn or urine checked because you 
want to play in the school band. Or imagine you are an inner-city resident 
subject to routine checkpoint stops as you walk around your own 
neighborhood,120 or an Arab American who is tracked on camera or through 
 
 116. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 10, at 85. 
 117. Id. at 87. 
 118. See supra text accompanying notes 44, 65, 68 and 95. 
 119. See sources cited supra notes 1–2. As Patrick Henry put it, under the general warrants “any 
man may be seized, any property may be taken, in the most arbitrary manner, without any evidence or 
reason.” Draper v. United States, 359 U.S. 307, 336 (1959) (quoting JAMES MADISON, I DEBATES IN 
THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 323, 326 
(Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836)). 
 120. See Andrea Estes, Anticrime Initiative Working, Police Say, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 28, 2004, at 
B1 (noting significant, albeit contested, reduction in nonfatal shootings as a result of dragnet stop 
programs, but quoting the head of the local NAACP branch, who stated that young blacks who are 
stopped “feel they have become the victims”). 
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digital means, singled out at travel centers, and subject to FBI interviews 
because a data-mining program indicates that you fit a terrorist profile. 
Admittedly, none of these law-enforcement actions involve the ransacking 
of homes or the custodial arrests that bothered the Framers. But research on 
laypeople’s views about the intrusiveness of various types of government 
investigative techniques indicates that even dragnets that do not involve 
physical entry—such as public camera surveillance or data mining of the type 
involved in the TIA program—are viewed as far more invasive than brief 
seizures at a roadblock, which the Supreme Court has acknowledged implicate 
the Fourth Amendment.121 Moreoever, if the images captured on public cameras 
are not immediately destroyed, study participants assign an intrusiveness rating 
almost equal to that of a bedroom search.122 
Furthermore, the fact that large numbers of people are enmeshed in such 
operations, which the Court has sometimes touted as a method of mitigating the 
sense of invasion,123 could actually increase the feeling of oppression in some 
types of cases. As Justice O’Connor noted in Vernonia, group-wide programs 
may reduce the potential for arbitrary action and dilute its “accusatory” nature, 
but they can also “pose a greater threat to liberty” because so many people are 
affected.124 And if dragnets are based on profiles, this threat can be exacerbated 
by what Bernard Harcourt has called the “ratchet effect.”125 Profiles have a 
tendency to become a self-fulfilling prophecy when they are the primary 
motivation behind law-enforcement efforts, which may mean that those who fit 
the profile are disproportionately affected. 
A separate but equally important consideration is that, because they are so 
easy to justify, dragnets provide tempting opportunities for pretextual police 
actions. If police cannot develop individualized probable cause to enter a house, 
perhaps a health and safety inspection will do the trick. If they want to ferret 
out drug couriers in a particular neighborhood but do not know which cars are 
involved, maybe a license checkpoint, along with a drug-sniffing dog, will help 
out. The phenomenon of “mission creep” is well-known in data-mining circles: 
antiterrorist programs discover many more illegal immigrants than they do Al 
Qaeda members.126 
 
 121. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 10, at 110–13 (camera surveillance results); 183–85 (data-mining 
results). 
 122. Id. at 112 tbl. item 18. 
 123. See supra notes 57 and 64 and accompanying text. 
 124. 515 U.S. 646, 667 (1995) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (internal citation and quotation omitted). 
 125. BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICY, AND PUNISHING IN 
AN ACTUARIAL AGE 147 (2007). 
 126. See MARY DEROSA, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC AND INT’L STUDIES, DATA MINING AND DATA 
ANALYSIS FOR COUNTERTERRORISM 16 (2004), available at 
www.cdt.org/security/usapatriot/20040300csis.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, TECHNOLOGY & PRIVACY 
ADVISORY COMM., SAFEGUARDING PRIVACY IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM 39–40 (2004), 
available at www.cdt.org/security/usapatriot/20040300tapac.pdf. 
SLOBOGIN_PROOF.DOC 12/20/2010 11:25:31 AM 
126 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 73:107 
Moreover, dragnets can be disguised as actions based on individualized 
suspicion. For instance, the federally funded program Operation Pipeline is 
designed to use traffic violations, which all of us commit all of the time, as 
means of obtaining consent or otherwise gaining authorization to search the car 
that is stopped,127 and the purpose behind many antiloitering statutes is to give 
police authority to arrest people believed to be affiliated with gangs.128 To the 
extent the targets perceive the pretextuality of any of these operations, the 
sense of unfairness is heightened. 
The repercussions of the resentment caused by dragnets could go well 
beyond momentary hostility toward the authorities. The procedural-justice 
literature shows that compliance with the law is intimately tied to respect for 
those enforcing it.129 If that respect dissipates, cooperation with law enforcement 
and perhaps the desire to be law-abiding itself can diminish, effects that studies 
of inner-city communities claim to have found.130 Recall also that dragnets were 
a major cause of the Revolution. 
IV 
CURRENT APPROACHES TO REGULATING DRAGNETS 
 
The Supreme Court’s take on dragnets is hard to pin down, but an effort at 
summarization is nonetheless made here. Also described in this section and the 
next are several alternatives to the Court’s analysis, with a focus on two 
alternatives that, when combined, suggest a promising way out of the morass: 
political-process theory and proportionality analysis. Dragnets authorized by 
legislation that is free of political-process defects should receive deference from 
the courts. When such deference is not merited, the government should have to 
demonstrate a success rate proportionate to the intrusion occasioned by the 
dragnet. 
A. Summary of the Court’s Current Approach 
Current law on dragnets appears to be very complicated. Supreme Court 
and lower-court case law considers a number of factors, listed here with 
examples suggesting the spectrum associated with each (with the examples most 
supportive of dragnets listed first): (1) whether the situation involves special 
needs or instead is an attempt to obtain evidence of ordinary criminal 
 
 127. For a description of the program, see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, 
INSIDE THE DEA: OPERATIONS PIPELINE AND CONVOY, available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/programs/ pipecon.htm. 
 128. See generally Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) (striking down a “failure to disperse” 
statute aimed at reducing gang-related criminal activity). 
 129. For a useful summary of this literature as applied to the effects of policing, see Andrew Taslitz, 
Wrongly Accused Redux: How Race Contributes to Convicting the Innocent: The Informants Example, 
37 SW. U. L. REV. 1091, 1114–18 (2008). 
 130. See id. (concluding that the deleterious effects of police techniques perceived as unfair can lead 
to an increase in crime). 
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wrongdoing (student drug testing v. narcotics checkpoint); (2) the significance 
of the government interest (prevention of terrorist acts v. detecting illegal 
immigrants); (3) the magnitude of the problem the government wants to 
address (smuggling contraband across the border v. drug use among customs 
agents); (4) the extent to which an individualized-suspicion requirement would 
prevent the government from achieving its goal (residential health and safety 
inspections v. drunken driving); (5) the intrusiveness of the dragnet (camera 
surveillance v. strip searches); (6) the degree of notice or consent (business 
inspections v. covert data mining); (7) the nature of ex ante review, if any 
(judicial authorization of dragnet fingerprinting v. checkpoints established by 
supervisors); and (8) the existence of a neutral plan that diminishes discretion 
(area-wide residential-inspection plans or roadblocks that accost all drivers v. 
random junkyard inspections for stolen parts). Different combinations of these 
factors have played a role in all of the Court’s dragnet cases. 
As the examples in parentheses suggest, however, usually only factor (1) is 
dispositive as far as the courts are concerned. The Fourth Amendment might 
prohibit a government dragnet when there is no evidence of concrete danger (as 
the Court held in Chandler, the politician drug-testing case) or if the dragnet is 
very unlikely to produce evidence of wrongdoing or highly discretionary (as the 
Court concluded with respect to random license checks in Prouse), and 
probably also when it is extremely intrusive relative to government need (for 
example, a general strip search of school children131). But otherwise the Court is 
willing to approve almost any dragnet that takes place outside of the typical 
criminal law-enforcement context. And because “ordinary criminal 
wrongdoing” is a slippery concept and, according to the courts, does not cover a 
wide array of government campaigns—including antiterrorist efforts, illegal-
immigrant interdictions, regulatory schemes aimed at crime-infested businesses 
(such as junkyards), or traffic-related offenses—this latter limitation is not 
particularly significant. In short, the Court’s dragnet jurisprudence leaves 
considerable room for play; virtually any government dragnet that avoids 
irrationality passes the Fourth Amendment. 
B. Better Balancing Versus No Balancing 
Many commentators have disagreed with the Court’s analysis, of course. 
Most have called for according less weight to government interests and more 
weight to individual interests, and have argued that the government should 
have a heavy burden to show why dispensing with an individualized-suspicion 
requirement is necessary.132 But these critiques have usually not offered any 
 
 131. See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009) (declaring the strip search of a 
student based on reasonable suspicion violated the Fourth Amendment). 
 132. See, e.g., Clancy, supra note 45, at 487 (arguing that suspicionless searches and seizures should 
be “aberrational” and founded on “a strong showing of governmental necessity”); Nadine Strossen, The 
Fourth Amendment in the Balance: Accurately Setting the Scales Through the Least Instrusive 
Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173 (1988) (arguing for least drastic means analysis); Scott 
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concrete way of gauging government and individual interests, nor specified how 
one balances them in a way that avoids simply implementing one’s policy 
preferences. Furthermore, for reasons suggested above and elaborated on 
below, calculating whether a dragnet is “necessary” is a chore that courts should 
not lightly undertake and probably should avoid altogether. 
Consider Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Vernonia, which is among the most 
thoughtful judicial approaches in this genre. In essence, she argued that dragnet 
actions should occur only when an individualized-suspicion regime would be 
both “ineffectual” because it would “place the government’s objectives in 
jeopardy” and “impractical” because the situation is such that “even one 
undetected instance of wrongdoing could have injurious consequences for a 
great number of people.”133 But, as Justice O’Connor herself recognized with 
respect to her first criterion, “a suspicion-based scheme . . . may not be as 
effective as a mass, suspicionless testing regime.”134 And once that is conceded, 
the second part of her test is also easily met, even in the student drug-testing 
situation, in which she argued it was not. As Justice Thomas’s majority opinion 
asserted: 
Deterring drug use by our Nation’s schoolchildren is at least as important as 
enhancing efficient enforcement of the Nation’s laws against the importation of drugs, 
which was the governmental concern in Von Raab, or deterring drug use by engineers 
and trainmen, which was the governmental concern in Skinner. School years are the 
time when the physical, psychological, and addictive effects of drugs are most 
severe. . . . And of course the effects of a drug-infested school are visited not just upon 
the users, but upon the entire student body and faculty, as the educational process is 
disrupted.135 
Similar comments can be made about virtually any dragnet program. 
Justice O’Connor’s approach is in essence a variant of strict-scrutiny 
analysis, which in the dragnet setting would require the government to 
demonstrate that a dragnet is narrowly tailored to meet a compelling law 
enforcement need.136 While this analytical scheme has served the courts fairly 
well in other contexts, in Fourth Amendment cases it places courts in the 
position of legislating much more conspicuously, and much less effectively, than 
in other settings. However competent courts may be, for instance, at assessing 
whether time, place, and manner restrictions on speech are necessary, they are 
sorely disadvantaged in analyzing which law-enforcement techniques work best. 
 
Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. 
L. REV. 383, 446 (1988) (arguing for a compelling state-interest–least-intrusive-means test that 
“unambiguously reorients fourth amendment analysis toward protection of the individual’s privacy 
interest”); Eve Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111 COLUM. L. REV. _ 
(forthcoming 2011) (arguing that dragnets should not be permitted if individualized suspicion can 
accomplish the government’s objective). 
 133. 515 U.S. 646, 674–75 (1995) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 134. Id. at 680 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 135. Id. at 661–62. 
 136. FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007) (holding that, to justify a law 
burdening political speech, government must show that the restriction “furthers a compelling interest 
and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest”). 
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Consider as an illustration how a court would apply strict-scrutiny analysis 
to a public camera system. Assume that the area in which the government wants 
to set up a camera system has a high crime rate and that research conducted in 
similar types of locations indicates that, through increased deterrence and 
apprehension, the presence of cameras can reduce property crime by as much as 
twenty-five percent and violent crime by as much as five percent (estimates 
based on actual studies).137 Difficult enough is determining whether these data 
make the government’s crime control objective “compelling.” Under traditional 
strict-scrutiny analysis, the court would also have to inquire into whether the 
camera system was narrowly tailored to meet the government’s objective. That 
inquiry raises a number of imponderables. Alternatives to a camera system 
could include placing more police on the scene (presumably limited to stopping 
people only when they have individualized suspicion), installing more street 
lights and greater pedestrian access to the area, and passing broader loitering 
laws that would allow police greater preventive authority.138 Comparing the 
effectiveness, not to mention the expense, of these competing approaches is far 
from the typical judicial job. And although assessing the relative intrusiveness 
of these various techniques is within the usual judicial purview, balancing that 
assessment with these other variables and figuring out which technique most 
efficaciously deals with the crime problem in the least restrictive manner raises 
micro-managing quandaries that are even more difficult and inappropriate for 
courts to address.139 
Perhaps in part for that reason, a second group of commentators have called 
for an end to balancing and instead would always require individualized 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion for any search of houses, persons, 
papers, or effects.140 But such a requirement would eliminate dragnets such as 
health and safety inspections that virtually everyone (probably including the 
Framers141) would want. And it cuts against the text of the Fourth Amendment, 
 
 137. See SLOBOGIN supra note 10, at 84–88. 
 138. Cf. Neal Katyal, Architecture as Crime Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1039, 1092–98 (2002) (exploring 
how city architecture might enhance crime control); City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 66 (1999) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (speaking of loitering statutes that might be “reasonable alternatives” to the 
statute struck down by the majority). 
 139. Recall Justice Rehnquist’s words in Michigan Department State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 
453–54 (1990) that, “for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, the choice among such reasonable 
alternatives remains with the governmental officials who have a unique understanding of, and a 
responsibility for, limited public resources, including a finite number of police officers.” See supra note 
68 and accompanying text. 
 140. See William J. Mertens, The Fourth Amendment and the Control of Police Discretion, 17 U. 
MICH. J. L. REF. 551 (1984). See also Justice Douglas’s dissent in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1967) 
(“Until the Fourth Amendment . . . is rewritten, the person and the effects of the individual are beyond 
the reach of all government agencies until there are reasonable grounds to believe (probable cause) 
that a criminal venture has been launched or is about to be launched[]”) and Justice Brennan’s dissent 
in T.L.O. v. New Jersey, 469 U.S. 325, 360 (1985) (“If the search in question is more than a minimally 
intrusive Terry stop, the constitutional probable-cause standard determines its validity.”). 
 141. See supra note 20. 
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which makes reasonableness, not particularized probable cause, the core of 
constitutional protection. 
A variation of this approach is to impose the individualized probable-cause 
requirement only in those situations in which the government seeks evidence of 
crime. This approach “reflects the intuition of the Court in various cases that 
‘special needs’ searches are more easily tolerated if they do not result in 
criminal penalties.”142 Of course, for this approach to have any impact in 
inspection cases and the like, the legislature would have to agree to drop any 
provision for criminal penalties in connection with health and safety 
inspections, immigration and drunk driving roadblocks, drug testing programs, 
and the like. Furthermore, under this approach the Fourth Amendment would 
provide privacy and property protection only to criminal suspects, a situation 
that, as Camara pointed out, would be “anomalous” at best.143 It is also one that 
the Framers probably did not countenance, since the revenue and customs laws 
that led to many of the general-warrant searches they maligned were at most 
quasi-criminal in nature.144 
Furthermore, exemption of civil searches would leave the scope of the 
Fourth Amendment at the mercy of legislative categorizations. As Burger and 
the drug-testing programs illustrate, dragnets can be classified as administrative 
and still achieve crime-control purposes.145 The type of traffic and loitering laws 
that can lead to pretextual dragnets are also often technically noncriminal. 
C. Political-Process Theory 
A third set of commentators has also deplored judicial balancing but has 
generally approved of the Court’s conclusions in the dragnet cases because the 
effect of the Court’s hands-off attitude is to leave the balancing up to the 
 
 142. Ricardo J. Bascuas, Lessons from the Highway and the Subway: A Principled Approach to 
Suspicionless Searches, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 719, 781 (2007). 
 143. See also New Jersey v. T.L.O, 469 U.S. 325, 335 (1985) (“[T]he individual’s interest in privacy 
and personal security ‘suffers whether the government’s motivation is to investigate violations of 
criminal laws or breaches of other statutory or regulatory standards . . . .’”). 
 144. See Davies, supra note 3, at 659–60 (distinguishing the “customs collections” that occasioned 
the general warrant from “criminal law enforcement”). 
 145. For this reason, Professor Simmons has proposed that when government purports to be 
carrying out “regulatory” searches and seizures, as the government has argued that it does in 
antiterrorism cases, it should be prohibited from using any evidence it garners in criminal prosecutions; 
that approach, he suggests, would call the government’s bluff. See Ric Simmons, Searching for 
Terrorists: Why “Public Safety” is Not a Special Need, 59 DUKE L.J. 843, 920 (2010). But this solution 
creates its own problems. Freed from any restrictions on its antiterrorism efforts, the executive branch 
might introduce numerous such programs, believing that, at the least, bombs will be discovered and 
terrorists identified. On the other side, a prohibition on prosecuting terrorists who are caught in an 
antiterrorist program would be very hard for the public to swallow. Further, this approach allows the 
government to carry out other suspicionless “special needs” searches and seizures as long as evidence 
thereby obtained is not used in a criminal court. Thus school students can be suspended, illegal 
immigrants deported through a civil process, and house residents subjected to civil fines based on 
dragnet stops and searches without violating the Fourth Amendment, despite the thousands of innocent 
individuals affected by drug testing, checkpoints, and health and safety inspections, respectively. 
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legislative branch. William Stuntz has argued that “Fourth Amendment 
regulation is usually unnecessary where large numbers of affected parties are 
involved. Citizens can protect themselves in the same way that they protect 
themselves against most kinds of government misconduct—they can throw the 
rascals out.”146 Richard Worf builds on this insight by explicating why, under 
political-process theory, dragnets approved by legislatures should usually 
receive a judicial pass.147 
Political-process theory attempts to mediate the interbranch tension caused 
by challenges to legislation under indeterminate constitutional provisions like 
the Due Process Clause.148 It does so by telling courts that such challenges 
should succeed only if the legislative pronouncement is the result of a 
significant defect in the democratic process. According to Worf, “The theory 
respects our society’s presumption of democratic decision making and simply 
holds that judicial review should always be affirmatively justified by some 
representation-reinforcing rationale.”149 
Worf ties this idea to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence by asserting that, 
when search and seizure of a group rather than of an individual is involved, 
representation of the relevant interests is often possible. If so, he argues, courts 
owe the results of democratic decisionmaking deference.150 As Worf notes, 
courts have long trusted legislative balancing of government and individual 
interests in other important constitutional arenas involving groups. Thus, he 
contends, we should be equally willing to trust legislatures to balance those 
interests in Fourth Amendment cases involving general searches and seizure: 
[T]he personal interests involved in [general] searches and seizures are often less 
compelling than those involved in cases where the Court already applies rational basis 
review. A drug test or the intrusion occasioned by being stopped on the road for a few 
minutes is certainly no more momentous than the values involved in the equal 
protection, due process, and takings cases. Those cases have involved much more than 
a brief intrusion on privacy. They have involved, for example, the right to equal 
funding of school districts . . . and the right to make decisions about when and how to 
end a terminally ill life . . . .151 
Worf concludes that, “[w]here only groups are affected, very important, 
disputed questions can safely be left to the political process.”152 He adds that the 
text of the Fourth Amendment says as much, for it is framed in terms of 
reasonableness, an inquiry into “social welfare maximization” that judges are 
no better equipped to address than legislatures, at least when groups rather 
than individuals are involved.153 
 
 146. William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power and the Fourth Amendment, 44 STAN. 
L. REV. 553, 588 (1992). 
 147. Worf, supra note 9. 
 148. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). 
 149. Worf, supra note 9, at 97. 
 150. Id. at 99. 
 151. Id. at 116–17. 
 152. Id. at 117. 
 153. Id. at 118–31. 
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D. When Political-Process Deference Would Not Apply 
Worf also recognizes, however, that many searches and seizures cannot be 
said to result from even the generous concept of democratic functioning that 
underlies rational-basis review. He identifies three principal process defects: (1) 
an absence of authorizing legislation, (2) legislation that delegates too much 
power to the executive branch, and (3) legislation that prejudices a discrete and 
insular minority.154 In these situations, Worf states, the Court should apply strict 
scrutiny rather than rational-basis review.155 
The first defect most obviously occurs in the run-of-the-mill search and 
seizure based on individualized suspicion. These actions are not authorized by 
legislation, but rather involve the exercise of police-officer discretion; a good 
example is Prouse, in which the Court pointed out that the officer “was not 
acting pursuant to any standards, guidelines, or procedures pertaining to 
document spot checks.”156 Another variant of this defect arises when some type 
of upper-level authorization exists, but it comes from an unelected body (Worf 
points to Ferguson, in which hospital officials and local police created the 
policy157) or from an elected body that does not represent the affected group (as 
might be true of some locally approved sobriety- or license-checkpoint 
programs that stop drivers from outside the jurisdiction158). 
A second defect occurs when authorizing legislation is enacted, but it fails to 
impose any meaningful constraints on officer discretion, thus in effect 
replicating the absence-of-legislation defect. Worf suggests that this defect was 
present in the ordinance struck down in Camara (which did not require the type 
of “neutral” plan Camara required) as well as in the statute upheld in Burger, 
since both laws allowed officers to inspect whenever they chose.159 As another 
example, assuming that the random license stops in Prouse had been authorized 
by legislation, they still would have been subject to strict scrutiny given the 
discretion such legislation would have vested in police officers. 
The third type of process flaw that Worf identifies, well-known to all 
constitutional-law buffs, occurs when the law generated by democratic 
decisionmaking discriminates against a group that is precluded from significant 
participation in the political process.160 Prisoners and aliens fit in this category, 
as would racial groups in some situations.161 Worf also suggests that a statute 
that authorized checkpoints in high-crime neighborhoods, although facially 
neutral, would be suspect if those neighborhoods are generally composed of 
 
 154. Id. at 137–38. 
 155. Id. 
 156. 440 U.S. 648, 650 (1979). 
 157. 532 U.S. 67, 88 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 158. Worf, supra note 9, at 138. 
 159. Id. at 149–50. 
 160. Id. at 152–58. 
 161. Id. at 153. 
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minorities.162 Although disparate-impact analysis has faded from other areas of 
constitutional law, Worf acknowledges it could have a place in Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence given the history of racial profiling in policing.163 At 
the least, dragnets aimed at minority or poor neighborhoods should be 
authorized through a democratic process that includes the residents of those 
neighborhoods.164 
Some of the dragnets discussed here manage to avoid all of these process 
defects. For instance, routine border searches and seizures are entitled to 
deference under political-process theory because they take place pursuant to 
federal legislation and affect everyone who enters the country at borders, 
international airports, and other functional equivalents of borders.165 The same 
can be said about neutral inspection schemes of the type required by Camara, 
Marshall, and Dewey, assuming they are also authorized by the relevant 
legislative body. The antiterrorism program involving ferries approved by the 
Second Circuit is another dragnet that would probably be subject only to 
rational-basis review because it was established under a congressional statute 
that directed the Coast Guard to develop vulnerability assessments of key 
transportation systems, and the officers conducting the program followed a set 
procedure (albeit one that could vary from boat to boat).166 
In most of the rest of the cases discussed above, however, one or more 
process defects were present. Most fit in the first process-defect category, 
involving dragnets that are not authorized by legislation. In some of these cases, 
the government actions were not traceable to any policy. In addition to the 
random stops in Prouse, already mentioned, the detentions in Davis and the 
DNA-sweep scenarios (as opposed to the legislatively established prisoner-
DNA collections) are examples of this phenomenon. Indeed, any dragnet aimed 
at solving a particular crime will always be subject to strict judicial scrutiny on 
this theory, given the impossibility of creating enabling legislation beforehand. 
In many other cases, a policy for the dragnet existed, but it was the 
brainchild of unelected law-enforcement agents or government bureaucrats. 
Illustrative here are not only Ferguson, but Sitz and Edmond (in which the 
 
 162. Id. at 154–57. 
 163. Id. 
 164. See Tracey L. Meares, Norms, Legitimacy and Law Enforcement, 79 OR. L. REV. 391 (2000) 
(discussing the importance of community involvement in devising effective law enforcement policies 
that are perceived as legitimate). 
 165. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1582 (“[A]ll persons coming into the United States from foreign countries 
shall be liable to detention and search . . . .”). Other border search statutes, however, are more 
problematic on this score. See 19 U.S.C. §1581(a) (2006) (“Any officer of the customs may at any time 
go on board of any vessel . . . at any place in the United States . . . and examine the manifest and other 
documents and papers . . . and to this end may hail and stop such vessel . . . and use all necessary force 
to compel compliance.”). Given the broad discretion this statute grants officials, it would not, under the 
approach advocated here, receive judicial deference, and contrary to the Supreme Court’s assertion in 
United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983), would not, by itself, have supported the 
boarding in that case.  
 166. See Cassidy v. Chertoff, 471 F.3d 67, 70–72 (2d Cir. 2006).  
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roadblocks policies were promulgated by the local police department), Von 
Raab and the Chicago tenement-sweep program (in which the policies were 
developed by federal officials), and MacWade, the New York subway case 
(involving a policy devised by city bureaucrats). Although in some or all of 
these cases a duly constituted elected body might have developed the same 
policy, the point is that the groups targeted never had an opportunity to present 
their points of view directly or through representatives. 
In other dragnet situations, enabling legislation from the appropriate body 
existed, but it granted field officers too much discretion; in addition to the 
inspections in Burger, the dragnets in Colonnade, Biswell, and Skinner (all 
involving inspections authorized by federal statute) provide examples of this 
situation. For instance, the drug-testing policy in Skinner was promulgated 
under authority of a provision in the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, which 
simply states that the Secretary of Transportation is to “prescribe, as necessary, 
appropriate rules, regulations, orders, and standards for all areas of railroad 
safety.”167 Many of the data-mining programs authorized by federal law suffer 
from the same problem and also fail to make clear the type of behavior that 
may be targeted.168  
In virtually all of these cases, the defect probably could have been remedied 
by legislation or regulations that more clearly delineated the scope and goals of 
the inspection in ways that would reduce executive discretion. In some dragnets 
situations (such as datamining endeavors), one way of doing so is by subjecting 
everyone (including members of the legislative and executive branches) to the 
search or seizure, an approach that would also force policy-makers to think 
through the effects of the power they are granting law enforcement. As Justice 
Jackson noted, “There is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary 
and unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law which 
officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally.”169 A similar 
solution is to require randomized police action.170 Where sufficiently discretion-
constraining rules from the legislature or the executive branch do not exist, 
however, judicial deference is unwarranted.  
The final process defect arises when legislation targets a discrete group that 
does not have ready access to the political process or whose voice will not be 
heard in the process for some other institutional reason. Martinez-Fuerte 
provides a pertinent illustration. Worf contends that the checkpoint in 
Martinez-Fuerte was constitutional because everyone who passed through it was 
 
 167. 45 U.S.C. § 431(a) (2006).   
 168. The legislation that defunded TIA permits the Defense Department and other agencies, after 
“appropriate consultation with Congress,” to pursue data mining of records on American as well as on 
foreign citizens for the purpose of gathering information relevant to “law enforcement activities.” 10 
U.S.C. § 2241(d) (2006). For other examples, see Primus, supra note 132, manuscript at 28–30.  
    169. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112–13 (1949) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
 170. Cf. Tracey Meares & Bernard Harcourt, Randomization and the Fourth Amendment 
(forthcoming 2010) (arguing for randomization as a way of reducing police power). 
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stopped and because the checkpoint locations were chosen by politically 
accountable officials, who had no reason to harass individual drivers, rather 
than by field officers.171 But there are at least two problems with this conclusion, 
suggested by Worf’s own analysis of other cases. First, the executive decisions 
challenged in Martinez-Fuerte were not just the initial stops authorized by 
supervisors but also the referrals to the secondary checkpoint, which were 
based entirely on the decisions of field officers, and concededly were not 
bottomed on probable cause or even reasonable suspicion.172 Second, the 
checkpoint’s heavy and explicit focus on people of Mexican American ancestry 
might amount to the type of disparate impact that courts should investigate 
closely. 
Three other situations demonstrate the third, group-exclusion defect, 
although all admittedly push its outer edge. First, as already mentioned, some 
dragnets, such as roadblocks, affect people who are not in the legislative body’s 
jurisdiction. Characterizing such individuals as “insular minorities” is a stretch, 
but if the democratic value is to be taken seriously, courts should recognize this 
problem in analyzing dragnets. 
A closely related and more important situation is when the affected group is 
so large and diffuse it cannot easily organize itself. Public-choice theory 
suggests that small groups will outperform large ones in the political process 
because they can better focus their lobbying efforts.173 Some of the groups 
targeted by dragnets (businesses, customs officers, and politicians) should have 
no difficulty orchestrating efforts against dragnets that are unpopular. But other 
targeted groups that are large and whose members are unrelated in any way 
other than the dragnet (for instance, those subject to roadblocks and camera 
surveillance) may experience significant collective-action obstacles. In contrast, 
their opposition—law enforcement—is the ideal collective-action group: small 
and cohesive, with easy access to legislators.174 
Finally, some dragnets affect people who cannot vote or are otherwise 
effectively excluded from the political process. Prisoners, subject to a number of 
dragnet programs, are the most obvious example. One implication of that fact 
might be that DNA collection programs are permissible under political-process 
theory only if they are expanded beyond prisoners to include other more 
politically powerful groups. Another insular group is the public-high-school 
population targeted by drug-testing programs. Although the programs in 
Vernonia and Earls were approved by elected school boards and parental input 
was sought, students were neither eligible to vote for the board nor given a 
 
 171. Worf, supra note 9, at 148–49. 
 172. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 546. 
 173. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY 
OF GROUPS 132 (1971) (“[I]ndividuals in a large group have no incentive to organize a lobby to obtain 
a collective benefit.”). 
 174. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 535 
(2001) (describing why prosecutors and police are a “very powerful lobby”). 
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voice at the board meetings.175 Close judicial scrutiny might be advisable in this 
situation as well, unless courts are willing to assume that parents speak for their 
children.176 Other groups, while having formal access to the political process, 
may in reality also be powerless to make their views known through that 
process.177 
Thus, in many of the Court’s cases involving dragnets, a process defect that 
should have triggered stricter scrutiny was manifestly present, and in most of 
the rest of those cases such a defect was at least arguably present. Ironically, in 
the one Supreme Court case in which there was clearly no such defect, the 
Court found the dragnet unconstitutional. In Chandler, the drug-testing 
program nullified by the Court was passed by the Georgia legislature and 
eliminated executive discretion by requiring testing of all political candidates, 
hardly a politically powerless group.178 Although the Court’s finding that there 
was “no concrete” proof of drug use by politicians can be equated with a finding 
that the legislation did not even have a rational basis, that reasoning would do 
violence to the notion of rationality review. As Chief Justice Rehnquist argued 
in his dissent, “[S]urely the State need not wait for a drug addict, or one inclined 
to use drugs illegally, to run for or actually become Governor before it installs a 
prophylactic mechanism.”179 Perhaps the Court was simply worried that its 
dragnet jurisprudence was cutting too close to home. 
V 
A HYBRID PROPOSAL 
Political-process theory has much to recommend it in the Fourth 
Amendment setting. While leaving courts in control of search and seizure law in 
individual cases, it reinforces democratic values (and avoids charges of 
Lochnerism) when the search or seizure is of a group, by presuming that 
legislation authorizing such actions is “reasonable.” But if the legislation fails to 
give voice to the targeted group or grants the executive branch too much 
discretion, courts are authorized to act on their own, in light of their best 
understanding of the Fourth Amendment. 
 
 175. See Bd. of Ed. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002); Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 
646 (1995). 
 176. Compare Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (“The law’s concept of the family rests on a 
presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment 
required for making life's difficult decisions.”), with Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 
(1976) (“Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the 
state-defined age of majority.”). 
 177. For further thoughts on the capaciousness of this political-process flaw, see Andrew Taslitz, 
Fourth Amendment Federalism and the Silencing of the American Poor, 85 CHI. KENT L. REV. 277 
(2010) (suggesting that legislation cannot always be trusted to represent the interests of the 
communities most affected by the legislation). 
 178. Worf suggests that candidates are a discrete and insular group. Worf, supra note 9, at 176–77. 
Although it is true that candidates from different parties might not easily cohere, the target group in 
Chandler was politicians as a group, which surely has sufficient clout in a democracy. 
 179. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 324 (1997) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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A. The Limits of Political-Process Theory 
Political-process theory cannot be the entire answer to the dragnet problem, 
however. It fails to address at least two concerns. First, to the extent the theory 
requires judicial deference to dragnet legislation, it may improperly deprive 
courts of their power to strictly scrutinize infringement of “those fundamental 
rights and liberties that are, objectively, ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history 
and tradition.’”180 In other words, general searches and seizures that impinge on 
sacrosanct liberties may be unconstitutional even if authorized by legislation 
that avoids all political process flaws. 
When a fundamental-liberty issue arises in due-process cases, courts can 
often point to specific rights recognized in colonial times or in medieval 
England.181 Analogously in the Fourth Amendment context, we know that some 
types of general searches and seizures—specifically, those involving the 
thorough search of the home required to find uncustomed goods and seditious 
papers182 and those that resulted in arrests183—were anathema at the time the 
Constitution was drafted, and that particularized probable cause was the 
Framer’s solution for that problem.184 History tells us then that, even if duly 
authorized by legislation, nonparticularized ransacking of homes and custodial 
arrests are unconstitutional (a position identical to that endorsed by the Warren 
Court’s dictum in Davis). Put another way, courts are obligated to invalidate 
such actions. However, the language and history of the Fourth Amendment are 
otherwise silent about general searches and seizures. Thus, most dragnets 
authorized by legislation that avoids process flaws are viable candidates for 
judicial deference. 
The second question left unanswered by political-process theory is what 
judicial scrutiny should look like on those many occasions when the general 
search or seizure is something less than an arrest or a full-blown search of 
private quarters and process flaws are present. Strict scrutiny—permitting only 
those dragnets that are narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest—is 
one candidate. Arguably, however, strict scrutiny is not required, given that 
these searches and seizures are, by historical definition, outside the 
fundamental liberty core. Nor is strict scrutiny advisable—at least the narrow-
tailoring aspect of it—given the aforementioned difficulty courts would have 
 
 180. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (quoting Moore v. City of East 
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (describing substantive-due-process analysis)). 
 181. See id. (finding a long tradition, spanning 700 years, of prohibiting suicide and assisting it). 
 182. See sources cited supra note 1–3. 
 183. For an account of the Framers’ views on arrests, both with and without a warrant, see Thomas 
Davies, Correcting Search-and-Seizure History: Now-Forgotten Common-Law Warrantless Arrest 
Standards and the Original Understanding of Due Process of Law, 77 MISS. L.J. 1, 171 (2007) 
(concluding that the Framers assumed that “due process of law” included the well-accepted probable-
cause limitation on arrests). 
 184. See generally David Steinberg, Restoring the Fourth Amendment: The Original Understanding 
Revisited, 33 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 47 (2005) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment was meant to 
govern only searches of homes and arrests). 
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making decisions about competing law enforcement needs and resources. 
Indeed, even legislatures can be flummoxed by these decisions, which is why 
legislation often delegates to law enforcement agencies the complex 
determinations about when and where to implement general searches and 
seizures.185 Some intermediate approach, between deference and strict scrutiny, 
is needed.186 
B. The Proportionality and Exigency Principles 
Elsewhere I have proposed a Fourth Amendment framework that might 
serve this purpose.187 The framework is meant to apply to all cases (not just 
dragnet programs) outside of those in which political-process theory mandates 
judicial deference. It requires adherence to two principles. The proportionality 
principle, recognized in Camara, is that “there can be no ready test for 
determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search against 
the invasion which the search entails.”188 The exigency principle, acknowledged 
(although admittedly not consistently endorsed) in a number of Supreme Court 
cases,189 is that some sort of ex ante authorization is required before nonexigent 
searches and seizures occur.190 
Although the proportionality principle endorses balancing, it does so 
according to a specific metric: the justification required for a search program—
defined in terms of the likelihood that the search or seizure will obtain evidence 
of wrongdoing—should be roughly proportionate to its intrusiveness. Thus, in 
order to determine the necessary justification, some assessment of a dragnet’s 
intrusiveness is necessary. Courts have tended to go with seat-of-the-pants 
determinations of this issue. But a better way of determining intrusiveness is by 
 
 185. See supra notes 167–68 and accompanying text. 
 186. Interestingly, administrative-law precedent, which could apply to regulations promulgated by 
law enforcement agencies under such statutes, reaches the same result. So-called Chevron deference to 
agency regulations only applies to rules that are based on “detailed and reasoned” considerations.” See 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Lisa Schultz Bressman, How 
Mead has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1492 (2005) (arguing that 
Chevron deference should be restricted “to procedures or interpretations that reflect transparency, 
rationality and consistency” and noting that the notice and comment procedure meets this 
requirement). Thus administrative-law precedent appears to call for some intermediate level of scrutiny 
as well. See Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE L. J. 952, 972 (2007) 
(stating that as a practical matter current law “requires that agencies specifically explain their policy 
choices, their consideration of important aspects of the problem, and their reasons for not pursing 
viable alternatives”). 
 187. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 10, at 43. 
 188. Id. at 21. 
 189. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 107–08 (1998) (“It remains textbook law that 
‘[s]earches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable absent 
exigent circumstances.’”). 
 190. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 10, at 44–45. 
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assessing legislative or lay views on the matter.191 This approach is consistent not 
only with the Court’s test focusing on “expectations of privacy society is 
prepared to recognize as reasonable,”192 but also with the democracy-enhancing 
thrust of political-process theory. Preliminary empirical efforts gauging societal 
views on intrusiveness indicate that the Court’s assessments of those views are 
sometimes quite accurate.193 But these studies also suggest that other 
conclusions of the Court, such as its holdings that public surveillance and data 
mining of personal information do not infringe societal expectations of privacy, 
are far off the mark.194 
Under proportionality reasoning, the intrusiveness of a government action 
dictates the justification necessary to carry it out. We know, given the history of 
the Fourth Amendment, that full-blown searches of houses and arrests require 
individualized probable cause. But in cases involving less intrusive searches and 
seizures, the proportionality principle would countenance a lesser showing. For 
instance, in individual cases involving frisks and stops, (which are perceived to 
be less intrusive than full searches and arrests) the proportionality principle 
might only require reasonable suspicion, a result that is consistent with the 
Court’s decision in Terry v. Ohio.195 And in dragnet stop and frisk situations, it 
would require what I call “generalized (reasonable) suspicion.”196 
Generalized suspicion can be thought of in terms of “hit rates.” Under 
proportionality reasoning, the more intrusive a dragnet program is, the higher 
its hit rate must be. Assume, for instance, that state officials, acting on their own 
rather than pursuant to legislation, want to search the bags of all individuals in a 
particular location. If such searches are considered to be somewhere between a 
frisk and a house search in terms of intrusiveness, officials should have to 
demonstrate that their procedure will obtain a hit rate approaching generalized 
probable cause.197 Assuming probable cause is quantified at roughly a more-
likely-than-not level, that threshold might amount to a showing that between 
one-quarter and one-half of the bags sought to be searched will contain the 
targeted evidence if the dragnet did not occur. If instead the government wants 
to set up a camera-surveillance operation in a given downtown area, a much 
lower hit-rate showing would be sufficient, given the lesser intrusiveness of 
 
 191. See Christopher Slobogin & Joseph Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and 
Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understandings Recognized and 
Permitted by Society,” 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 742–51 (1993); SLOBOGIN, supra note 10, at 113–16. 
 192. The language comes from Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 193. See Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 191, at 739. 
 194. Id. at 740; SLOBOGIN, supra note 10, at 111–13, 183–85. 
 195. See 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 196. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 10, at 40 (distinguishing generalized from individualized suspicion 
on the ground that the former is more explicitly based on profiles or statistical information). 
 197. A similar proposal is made by Meares & Harcourt, supra note 170. 
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camera surveillance.198 It was this type of analysis that the Tenth Circuit adopted 
but the Supreme Court summarily rejected in Earls. 
Assessment of hit rates might have to be speculative if a particular type of 
dragnet has never been attempted. But presumably a dragnet chosen in good 
faith by executive officials is motivated by the perception that a significant 
problem exists. For instance, testimony in Skinner revealed that a large 
percentage of the train accidents and safety incidents over an eight-year period 
were caused by drug- or alcohol-impaired employees.199 In Vernonia (in contrast 
to Earls), evidence of student drug use and disciplinary problems associated 
with it was robust.200 In the absence of such facts, courts applying strict scrutiny 
should be leery of finding a dragnet is justified. In practice, adoption of 
proportionality analysis would probably mean that most dragnets would be 
disapproved (unless authorized by legislation that meets the demands of 
political process theory). 
In contrast to the Court’s balancing approach, which purports to consider 
numerous factors, and strict-scrutiny analysis, which looks at both the 
importance of the government’s interest and the effectiveness of alternative 
investigatory methods, proportionality reasoning is single-mindedly focused on 
intrusiveness and hit rates. This difference is justifiable on both jurisprudential 
and pragmatic grounds. As a normative matter, the inquiry into average 
citizens’ perceptions about intrusiveness aligns with the Supreme Court’s 
insistence that the core value protected by the Amendment is privacy. As a 
practical matter, the intrusiveness notion is very familiar to the courts201 and 
avoids direct reliance on problematic factors such as whether the search or 
seizure is “civil” or “criminal” in motivation or whether the targets of the 
dragnet are “on notice.”202 Similar jurisprudential and pragmatic advantages are 
associated with the justification inquiry under proportionality analysis. Hit rates 
are simply an explicit quantification, in the group setting, of the likelihood 
analysis that the probable-cause and reasonable-suspicion standards demand in 
evaluating individual searches and seizures—in short, they define when a state 
interest is compelling in the group search context.203 And because certainty 
levels are the Fourth Amendment’s bread and butter, judges are familiar with 
the concept, and thus can relatively reliably ascertain when the government’s 
 
 198. For a full discussion of this concept, see SLOBOGIN, supra note 10, at 39–44. 
 199. 489 U.S. 602, 606 (1989). 
 200. 515 U.S. 646, 662–63 (1995). 
 201. A survey of Supreme Court cases indicates that the word “intrusive” or “invasive” appears in 
over 200 majority opinions analyzing the individual interests at stake in Fourth Amendment cases. 
Intrusion Cases (data on file with author and Law and Contemporary Problems). 
 202. However, these types of considerations might assume importance to the extent they affect 
perceptions of intrusiveness. For instance, a search that is experienced as facilitative (such as a health 
and safety inspection) might be seen as less intrusive than a search that is seen as adversarial. See 
Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 191, at 768–69. 
 203. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 10, at 40 (arguing that “the distinction between individualized and 
generalized suspicion is, in all relevant respects, meaningless” because both deal with probabilities). 
SLOBOGIN_PROOF.DOC 12/20/2010 11:25:31 AM 
Summer 2010] GOVERNMENT DRAGNETS 141 
interest is “compelling.” In contrast, determining whether a dragnet is 
“necessary” to accomplish the government’s aim of solving or deterring crime 
effectively or whether its costs outweigh its benefits is more competently carried 
out by legislatures and law enforcement agencies. 
The implications of the exigency principle for dragnets can be more simply 
explained. Outside of emergencies, some type of ex ante review should be 
sought. The requirement that executing officers seek a second opinion curbs the 
temptation to act in a biased or unreasonable fashion and helps to assure that 
the justification required by the proportionality principle exists ex ante. 
However, this ex ante review need not always take the form of a warrant based 
on individualized probable cause found by a magistrate. As Martinez-Fuerte 
suggested, upper-level determinations by politically accountable officials may 
suffice,204 and as the Court indicated in Davis, even when a judge conducts the 
review, something other than individualized probable cause can authorize less 
intrusive sorts of dragnets.205 
Further, ex ante review need not be sought when real exigency exists. Nor 
would the dictates of the proportionality principle necessarily apply in this 
situation. As the Supreme Court suggested in Terry v. Ohio in upholding frisks 
for weapons on less than probable cause, when a search or seizure is necessary 
to prevent imminent and significant harm, both ex ante review and justification 
requirements can be relaxed.206 In short, there should be what I call a “danger 
exception” to these requirements.207 
The danger exception should not, however, permit a relaxed showing merely 
because a given dragnet might result in improved general deterrence, the type 
of justification Chief Justice Rehnquist advanced for the random stops in 
Prouse208 and that Justice Thomas endorsed in Earls.209 That is the type of 
complicated analysis that should be reserved for legislatures; courts have no 
business making policy decisions about whether general deterrence will be 
enhanced by a particular dragnet, and should not approve (or disapprove) 
government actions on such general grounds. Rather, the exception kicks in 
only when a specific harm is targeted by a dragnet, such as when a roadblock is 
set up to nab a terrorist or kidnapper on the loose. Various members of the 
Court have identified these latter situations as the type of dragnet in which 
neither a warrant nor probable cause is required, but they have either provided 
 
 204. 428 U.S. at 562. 
 205. 398 U.S. at 727; see also Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 817 (1985) (“[U]nder circumscribed 
procedures, the Fourth Amendment might permit the judiciary to authorize the seizure of a person on 
less than probable cause and his removal to the police station for the purpose of fingerprinting.”). 
 206. 392 U.S. 1, 26–27 (1967) (allowing stops based on reasonable suspicion rather than probable 
cause in part because “a perfectly reasonable apprehension of danger may arise long before the officer 
is possessed of adequate information to justify taking a person into custody for the purpose of 
prosecuting him for a crime”). 
 207. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 10, at 26–28. 
 208. 440 U.S. at 660–61. 
 209. 536 U.S. at 841 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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no justification for this intuition or proffered the illogical one that these 
situations do not involve targeting “ordinary criminal wrongdoing.”210 The 
better rationale is that specific emergencies cannot be anticipated by 
legislatures, so that the executive branch should be able to act on its own when 
it perceives such an emergency, with courts playing the role of ex post reviewer 
to ensure that the emergency was real. 
C. Exclusion as a Remedy for Dragnet Seizures 
A last observation has to do with the remedy for illegal dragnets. Exclusion 
of evidence, the typical remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation, will often 
be inapposite in group search situations, either because the dragnet is not 
designed to obtain evidence of crime or because, even if it is, most people 
affected by it are innocent of wrongdoing and thus will have no use for 
exclusion. Injunctions and damages will be the preferred recourse, as evidenced 
by most of the cases discussed in this article.211 
The exclusionary remedy can play a very important role, however, in 
regulating dragnets used as pretexts. Although the Supreme Court has indicated 
that pretext arguments will not be countenanced when individualized probable 
cause is present212—as is often the case when stops are avowedly made because 
of a traffic violation, for instance—it has also held that such arguments are still 
justiciable when the police action is based on something less than probable 
cause—as is almost always the case with dragnets.213 Furthermore, the Court has 
recently emphasized that exclusion is most clearly warranted when it will deter 
bad-faith police actions.214 Taking the Court at its word, exclusion could be the 
remedy of choice when a litigant proves that evidence seized during the typical 
suspicionless dragnet—inspections, roadblocks, drug testing, or data mining—is 
not related to the supposed justification for it. This implementation of the 
exclusionary remedy would deter pretextual actions and also make the 
 
 210. For instance, in Edmond, the majority stated that “the Fourth Amendment would almost 
certainly permit an appropriately tailored roadblock set up to thwart an imminent terrorist attack or to 
catch a dangerous criminal who is likely to flee by way of a particular route,” City of Indianapolis v. 
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000), but one sentence later repeated “we decline to approve a program 
whose primary purpose is ultimately indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control.” Id; 
see also Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 417, 424–25 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Brinegar v. 
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 211. Other accountability mechanisms—such as ensuring that efficacy reviews take place and that 
the public be kept apprised of the dragnets—should also be instituted, and some of these protections 
are arguably constitutionally required. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 10, at 132–36. 
 212. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). 
 213. Id. at 811–12 (indicating that “ulterior motives” can invalidate police action “conducted in the 
absence of probable cause” and citing Burger, Dewey, and car-inventory cases as examples of situations 
in which pretext arguments might be availing). 
 214. Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 702 (2009) (“To trigger the exclusionary rule, police 
conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently 
culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system.”). 
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government think more carefully about the costs and benefits of a proposed 
dragnet.215 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
Government efforts to carry out dragnets are likely to proliferate in 
response to a number of modern-day pressures, ranging from increased criminal 
and national security threats to advances in surveillance and profiling. To date, 
the Supreme Court has given the government considerable leeway in carrying 
out these general searches and seizures. Most counter-proposals, in contrast, 
would severely restrict their use. 
 This article proposes an intermediate approach. Unless arrests or full-blown 
house searches (both of which require individualized probable cause) are 
involved, courts should defer to legislatively approved dragnets that meet the 
dictates of political-process theory and are not clearly irrational. If the dragnet 
is not legislatively authorized, it should be invalidated except when it is aimed 
at preventing a specific, imminent, and significant threat. If the dragnet is 
established through legislation but the legislation grants significant discretion to 
the executive branch or focuses on or substantially affects an unrepresented 
discrete and insular minority, courts should scrutinize the dragnet’s adherence 
to proportionality and exigency principles. Proportionality analysis would 
require generalized suspicion proportionate to the intrusion visited on 
individuals subject to the dragnet, and the exigency principle would require ex 
ante review of the dragnet, except in emergency situations. This framework may 
well provide the best method of reconciling democratic values with the right to 
be secure from government overreaching, against which the Fourth 
Amendment protects. 
 
 
 215. See Bascuas, supra note 142, at 787–90 (making a similar argument). 
